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Introduction
In recent decades, public sector accounting 
reforms have been one of the most striking 
aspects of the adoption of New Public 
Management (NPM) (Lapsley & Pallot, 2000; 
Christensen, 2007; Christensen & Parker, 
2010; Ball & Craig, 2010; Pollanen & Loiselle-
Lappointe, 2012). Accrual accounting, which 
is closely related to public-sector accounting 
reforms, has been studied in various contexts 
from various perspectives (Pallot, 1994; Shand, 
1990; English, Guthrie, & Carlin, 2000; Ryan, 
1998; Carnegie & Wolnizer, 1995; Barton, 
1999; Carnegie & Wolnizer, 1999; Salinas, 
2002; Carlin, 2005). However, the literature 
has presented limited evidence of the adoption 
of accrual accounting in emerging countries 
(e.g., the role of accountants in accounting 
reform in Malaysia, Nor-Aziah & Scapens 
(2007) and Saleh (2007); the accounting reform 
model in Thailand, Upping & Oliver (2012); 
accounting reform in Indonesia, Marwata & Alam 
(2006); the adoption of accrual accounting in 
Indonesia, Harun & Robinson (2010); and local 
government accounting reform in Indonesia, 
McLeod & Harun (2014)).
Administrative reforms such as the 
implementation of accrual-based rules are 
particularly encouraged by the European 
Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Developing 
countries are pressured to adopt administrative 
reforms that the international organizations 
considers best practice (Andrews, 2012). 
Because these organizations can be viewed as 
external actors, the above-referenced reforms 
can be characterized as top-down reforms. 
However, it is important not to overlook local 
governments – which can be viewed as internal 
actors – as practitioners of rules, standards 
and reforms (Sezen, 2011, p. 322). There are 
several important reasons that the emerging 
country of Turkey represents an interesting 
and important case of policy transfer, including 
(for example) the implementation of accrual 
accounting at the local government level. 
First, Turkey does not fi t into either Europe or 
the Middle East (Müftüler Bac, 2005, p.18), 
although it will soon join the EU. Turkey’s long 
road to EU membership affects all levels of 
society, including local governments, and most 
of the EU’s directives will be implemented at the 
local level. To the best of our knowledge, the 
EU’s effect on the implementation of accrual-
based rules has not been studied at the level of 
local government. Second, emerging countries 
have a rapidly increasing population. Turkey’s 
population was 56.4 million in 1990, 67.8 million 
in 2000, 73.2 million in 2010 and 77.6 million in 
2014. Rapid urbanization, a growing labor force 
and high youth unemployment are additional 
social factors that have implications for social 
policy (Sözen & Shaw, 2002, p. 478). Because 
of this rapid urbanization, new municipalities 
are being created to address societal needs. In 
this context, our research has been stimulated 
by the implementation and consequences 
of accounting reforms in newly established 
municipalities; to the best of our knowledge, 
this has never been studied before.
The effects of these accounting reforms 
– including municipal size, municipal wealth, 
citizen education level, staff education level, 
debt ratio, external audits, implementation 
of EU-funded projects and newly created 
municipalities – have resulted in various levels 
of compliance with accrual-based rules among 
Turkey’s new municipalities. This leads us to 
question why some municipalities demonstrate 
a heightened level of compliance with 
accrual-based rules. Examining 102 Turkish 
municipalities, we employ institutional theory 
and resource-dependence theory to increase 
our understanding of the factors that affect the 
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level of compliance with accrual-based rules. 
We performed a multiple regression analysis 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013) and 
found that the most infl uential predictors of the 
level of compliance are as follows: external 
audit, implementation of EU-funded projects 
and being a new municipality. 
Our paper makes two primary contributions. 
First, we contribute to the literature on 
governmental accounting by adding institutional 
factors other than economic variables that 
affect the level of compliance. This addresses 
an important gap in the literature identifi ed by 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001, p. 593): “… Another 
follow-up to this work would be an extension 
of the extant governmental accounting 
literature incorporating institutional variables in 
a statistical model... We suspect that economic 
variables based on size, fi scal stress and debt 
levels will no longer continue the signifi cant 
variables…” In this sense, our study is one of 
the fi rst to show that the level of compliance 
with accrual-based rules is increased not only 
by being a newly founded municipality but also 
by implementing EU-funded projects. Second, 
we contribute to the literature in that our fi ndings 
may help both politicians and government 
managers to identify resource dependency as 
an institutional pressure; coercive institutional 
pressure to implement accrual-based rules 
may become a potent force to increase the 
level of compliance both when a supreme audit 
institution controls and when there is resource 
dependence on an international body (i.e., the 
EU). One practical implication of our fi ndings is 
that compliance levels are positively associated 
both with the implementation of EU-funded 
projects and with newly founded municipalities.
Accordingly, part one presents the 
theoretical framework. Part two describes the 
research question and hypothesis development. 
Part three presents the development of the 
compliance index; part four presents the data. 
Part fi ve analyses the study’s results and is 
followed by the discussion and conclusion.
1. Theoretical Framework
Various theoretical frameworks may be used to 
study the adoption of accrual accounting in the 
public sector. Antipova and Bourmistrov (2013), 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001), Guler, Guillen and 
Macpherson (2002), Greening and Gray (1994), 
and Guo (2007) have used institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and  resource-
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
to gain insight into several aspects of public-
sector behavior. We also borrow theoretical 
ideas from institutional theory and resource-
dependence theory to understand – with the 
help of our hypothesis – the factors that affect 
the level of compliance with the prescribed 
accrual-based rules.
Institutional theory views organizations as 
operating within a social framework of norms, 
values and taken-for-granted assumptions 
about what constitutes appropriate or 
acceptable economic behavior (Carpenter 
& Feroz, 2001). According to Scott (1987, 
p. 468), organizations conform to institutional 
changes in their environment because they 
are rewarded with increased legitimacy, 
resources and survival ability. The institutional 
environment of local governments – including 
central government, educational institutions, 
accounting professionals, employees, creditors, 
and citizens – may help reform to gain legitimacy 
and external support from both external bodies 
and internal participants (Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001). Dimaggio and Powell (1983) identify three 
mechanisms for institutional isomorphic change: 
coercive isomorphism, normative isomorphism 
and mimetic isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism 
arises out of political infl uence and the problem 
of legitimacy; it is characterized by the imposition 
of rules to adopt the same types of changes 
in both structures and processes. The EU’s 
decision to adopt international standards may 
imply a coercive decision (Gomes, Fernandes, & 
Carvalho, 2015). Mimetic isomorphism results from 
standard responses to uncertainty and defi nes 
the adoption of changes that are experienced 
by other organizations. Normative isomorphism, 
which is associated with professionalism, refers 
to the strong infl uence and pressure exercised by 
professional organizations. The infl uence of the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
and the International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards Board (IPSASB) may be examples 
of normative forces pressing the adoption of 
international public-sector accounting standards 
(IPSAS) (Gomes et al., 2015). These isomorphic 
processes cause organizations to become 
similar, thus facilitating their transactions with one 
another. Although the three mechanisms may 
be derived under different conditions and have 
different outcomes, they tend to “intermingle in an 
empirical setting” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 67). 
Notwithstanding the fact that each mechanism 
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involves a separate process, two or more 
isomorphic pressures can operate at the same 
time; in such a situation, it is diffi cult to clearly 
identify the effects of each type of pressure.
Prior research also confi rms the 
importance of these concepts to gaining 
insight from accounting changes. According 
to Carpenter and Feroz (2001), accounting 
reforms in the United States (USA) can be 
understood in terms of coercive isomorphic 
pressures from the credit markets, whereas 
late adoption seems to be associated with 
the combined infl uences of normative and 
mimetic institutional pressures (p. 588). In 
the Canadian case, the implementation of 
accrual accounting can be “largely attributed 
to coercive and normative infl uences of the 
Offi ce of the Auditor General of Canada and 
mimetic isomorphism with other members 
of the federal government’s organizational 
fi eld” (Baker & Rennie, 2006, p. 83). Gomes 
et al. (2015) conclude that “the reform stimuli 
are mainly infl uenced by the institutional 
and political context and a combination of 
coercive, normative and mimetic forces” in their 
contribution to the Portuguese case (p. 279). All 
three isomorphic mechanisms may infl uence 
organizational behavior. That notwithstanding, 
because the government’s introduction of new 
accounting and reporting standards is the most 
direct mechanism of institutional diffusion, this 
paper draws largely on coercive isomorphism 
to explain compliance levels. Coercive 
isomorphism results when organizations 
are subjected to both formal and informal 
pressures by other organizations upon which 
it is dependent (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). In 
our study, organizations experience external 
pressure that is exerted by international bodies 
such as the IMF, the EU, and the WB. Such 
pressure may be felt as force, persuasion or an 
invitation to collude (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983).
In addition, our study adopts the perspective 
that resource dependence is a potent form 
of coercive institutional pressure for change 
associated with the implementation of accrual-
based accounting rules. The fundamental 
assertion of resource-dependence theory is 
simply stated by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978): 
The key to organizational survival is the ability 
to both acquire and maintain sources (p. 2). 
Organizations are not completely autonomous; 
instead, their resource needs cause them 
to be dependent on their environment. 
An organization’s degree is determined by 
the importance and concentration of the 
resources that it is provided (Froelich, 1999). 
To understand organizational decision making, 
the resource-dependence perspective focuses 
primarily on external factors (Carpenter & 
Feroz, 2001). Mizruchi and Fein (1999) suggest 
that pressure from external resource providers 
results in coercive isomorphism and “is thus 
analogous to formulations of the resource 
dependency model in which organizations 
are viewed as constrained by those on whom 
they depend for resources” (p. 657). Resource 
dependence results in accounting changes 
infl uenced by coercive isomorphic pressure. 
Thus, the theoretical arguments related to 
resource dependence represent a particular 
form of coercive isomorphic pressure (Carpenter 
& Feroz, 2001, p. 573).
2. Research Questions and 
Hypothesis Development
In Turkey, discussions about strong central 
power and weak local governments, the lack of 
autonomy for local governments and the need 
to strengthen democracy are common among 
scholars (Sezen, 2011, p. 329). Primarily for 
this reason, the Turkish government decided 
to strengthen local governments as a key 
priority. Accordingly, between 2004 and 2010, 
special laws and regulations pertaining to 
local governments were introduced (Sözen, 
2012). Consistent with international trends, 
on December 24, 2003, the “Public Financial 
Management and Control Law, No: 5018” 
(PFMCL) was issued as a key component of 
fi nancially strengthening local governments. 
According to that law, both governmental 
accounting reform (which became effective 
for local governments at the beginning of 
2006) and the cash-based “Government 
Accounting by Law” (which had existed for 
14 years) were abolished. An accrual-based 
government accounting system has now 
been implemented in all institutions, including 
centralized governments, social security 
institutions and local governments. The law’s 
most important reform is the introduction of 
a uniform accounting system on an accrual 
basis and an annexed budget administration in 
accordance with international accounting and 
reporting standards.
Little attention has been paid to the level 
of municipalities’ compliance with the accrual 
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accounting regulations that have been prescribed 
by the Local Authorities Budget and Accounting 
Regulation since 2006. Most of the Turkish 
studies about the process of implementing 
accrual accounting are exploratory because 
of the diffi culty of collecting data about Turkish 
municipalities. Although municipalities are 
supposed to upload their fi nancial accounts to 
their offi cial websites, they rarely do so. According 
to Turkyener (2011), there are many errors in 
municipalities’ fi nancial reports. In addition, many 
studies have shown that the failure in accounting 
standards is caused by numerous problems 
in the implementation process (Christiaens 
& Rommel, 2008). Accordingly, several 
hypotheses have been formulated to determine 
the reasons for the level of compliance in the 
public sector (Evans & Patton, 1983; Ingram, 
1984; Robins & Austin,  1986; Evans & Patton, 
1987; Giroux, 1989; Dixon et al., 1991; Cheng, 
1992; Allen & Sanders, 1994; Pina & Torres, 
1996; 2003; Coy et al., 1994; Coy & Dixon, 2002; 
Christiaens, 1999; Weets & Jegers, 2000; Giroux 
& McLelland, 2003; Christiaens & Vanhee, 2003; 
Da Costa Carvalho, et al., 2007; Verbruggen, 
2011). Although these studies’ investigations 
have resulted in valuable insights and interesting 
hypotheses, little has been produced with 
respect to emerging-country characteristics. 
Therefore, insight into whether newly founded 
municipalities and the implementation of EU 
projects affect compliance levels could be an 
important factor in the success of emerging 
countries. In addition, developing countries are 
countries in which ideas move in one direction 
and practice moves in another (Ouda, 2004). 
A developing country’s characteristics may affect 
other characteristics. Consequently, we not only 
determined compliance levels but also tested 
our hypothesis to monitor the factors that affect 
compliance levels. Against this background, we 
formulate the research question as follows:
RQ: Why do some Turkish municipalities 
apply accrual-based rules more than others?
Accordingly, working from the research 
question and previous studies, we have 
formulated the following hypotheses, which 
focus on the specifi c variables of emerging-
country characteristics. To improve the 
analysis, traditional variables are added as 
control variables to test whether they have the 
same impact on Turkish local governments.
The fi rst emerging-country variable is 
Turkey’s increasing population and its effect 
on local government policy. The population of 
Turkey was 56.4 million in 1990, 67.8 million 
in 2000, 73.2 million in 2010 and 77.6 million 
in 2014. Despite this rapid increase, the 
proportion of the population living in rural areas 
is decreasing while the proportion is increasing 
markedly in both the provinces and the district 
centers; thus, the proportion of the population 
living in the provinces and district centers 
was 59% in 1990, 64.9% in 2000, 76.3% in 
2010 and 91.8% in 2014. As legitimate policy 
partners with the central government, local 
governments work to formulate policies in the 
midst of these sociodemographic changes. To 
manage these diffi culties in areas where the 
population is rapidly increasing, municipalities 
are being created; for example, 13 metropolitan 
municipalities were created on November 
12, 2012. These new municipalities require 
more fi nancial and human resources because 
they are required to enact changes such as 
establishing guest houses for women and 
children and making new staff assignments. 
Thus, we hypothesize that to acquire legitimacy 
from the institutional environment – and thus 
more resources for new policies and survival – 
municipalities founded between 2006 and 2014 
will have a higher level of compliance (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Pressure from external resource providers 
may result in coercive isomorphism during 
the process of obtaining these resources 
(Carpenter & Feroz, 2001, p. 572). To the 
best of our knowledge, no study has analyzed 
the compliance level of new municipalities. 
Therefore,
H1: The level of compliance is positively 
associated with the type of the municipality.
Another emerging-country variable relates 
to Turkey’s EU accession. Turkey’s path to 
EU membership started with the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit, at which the European Council declared 
that ‘‘Turkey is a candidate country destined to 
join the EU on the basis of the same criteria as 
applied to the other candidate states.’’ Based 
on that declaration, to become an EU member, 
Turkey had to fulfi ll the political requirements of 
the Copenhagen criteria (Müftüler-Baç, 2008). 
At its 2002 Copenhagen summit, the European 
Council stated, ‘‘If Turkey fulfi ls the Copenhagen 
criteria, the European Union will open 
accession negotiations without delay.’’ During 
this long journey, “Turkey’s accession depends 
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on its ability to adopt fully the EU acquis in its 
entirety and to remain committed to democratic 
principles and procedures that the EU stands 
upon” (Müftüler-Baç, 2008, p. 201). The EU is 
committed to fi nancially supporting Turkey in 
this diffi cult task on its path to membership. The 
initial objective of the EU’s fi nancial support for 
Turkey is the extension of an area of peace, 
stability and prosperity within and beyond 
Europe; for the most part, Turkey has tended 
to comply in the area of education (http://www.
avrupa.info.tr/AB_Mali_Destegi.html). The EU 
usually gives fi nancial support for project 
implementation. Most of the EU’s directives are 
to be implemented at the local level, and EU 
support benefi ts society at all levels, including 
that of local government. Turkish municipalities 
also apply to receive funding for EU projects. 
Following a consultation process between 
the EU and Turkish authorities, projects are 
selected and included in the annual national 
program. These programs will receive EU 
funds. When an institution’s project is funded by 
the EU, its related institutions must report their 
fi nancials to the EU according to international 
fi nancial reporting standards. This requirement 
is the basis for our hypothesis that the EU 
engages in a form of coercive isomorphism. In 
addition, according to resource-dependence 
theory (in which resources can be money, 
human resources, etc.), organizations survive 
only if they both manage and monitor their 
dependencies (Hillman, Withers & Collins et al., 
2009). Accordingly, we aim to measure – for the 
fi rst time – whether the implementation of an 
EU-funded project has an impact on the level of 
compliance. Therefore,
H2: The level of compliance is positively 
associated with the implementation of EU-
funded projects.
The effect of our fi rst control variable – the 
size of the municipality – on the compliance 
level is disputed by several studies. According 
to Allen and Sanders (1994), city size does not 
affect disclosure, whereas Christiaens (1999) 
has discovered that city size has a signifi cant 
positive effect on the level of compliance. In 
contrast, Da Costa Carvalho et al. (2007) have 
claimed that the size of the municipality has 
a negative effect on compliance. In addition, 
many studies indicate no relationship between 
compliance and municipality size (Evans & 
Patton, 1983; Robbins & Austin, 1986; Ingram 
& DeJong, 1988). Institutionalization refers to 
organizations gaining legitimacy by adopting 
elements from the institutional environment 
to survive (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). Here, we hypothesize 
that larger municipalities’ more substantial 
fi nancial and human resources lead to a higher 
level of compliance. Following the standard 
statistical recommendation, we tested the 
effect of population on compliance level with 
a logarithmic transformation. Therefore,
H3: The level of compliance is positively 
associated with the size of the municipality.
The effect of staff on the level of compliance 
has been analyzed by many governmental 
studies in terms of the number of staff 
members, educational level, professionalism, 
etc. (Ingram, 1984; Robbins & Austin, 1986; 
Christiaens, 1999, Christiaens & Peteghem, 
2007; Da Casto Carvalho et al., 2007). We 
tested the effect of staff members’ education 
level on compliance level. The compound level 
of education has been measured by the formula 
(2*LT + 1*ST + 0*S) / (LT + ST + S), in which 
LT stands for university degree, ST stands 
for high school and S stands for secondary 
education (Christiaens, 1999; Christiaens & 
Peteghem, 2007). According to Christiaens 
(1999), one advantage of this approach is 
comparability among municipalities, whereas 
arbitrarily chosen weighting coeffi cients are 
a disadvantage. Here, we hypothesize that more 
highly educated staff will have more knowledge 
of accrual accounting rules. Therefore,
H4: The municipal accounting staff’s 
educational level positively affects the level of 
compliance.
Environmental factors are also relevant 
to explaining differences in conformity among 
municipalities. Arguably, a democratically 
elected local government must respond to 
its citizens’ needs (Da Casto Carvalho et al., 
2007). As highlighted by Chan (2006), both 
citizen awareness and socioeconomic status 
may be relevant to the adoption of accounting-
system changes. Accordingly, this hypothesis 
is proxied by assuming that citizens who live 
on a municipality’s borders and have a higher 
educational level demand more information; the 
compliance level is therefore higher because 
people with higher educational levels prefer to 
acquire/obtain more detailed and transparent 
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information. (The level of education completed 
in higher education refers to the percentage of 
citizens who have (at minimum) graduated from 
university.) In addition, a resource dependence 
relationship exists between the municipality 
and the citizen as a taxpayer. Therefore:
H5: The level of compliance is positively 
associated with the educational level of the 
municipality’s residents.
Profi tability may be a factor that is crucial 
to infl uencing the level of compliance (Street 
& Gray, 2002). Municipalities can also be 
fi nanced with debt. Financial institutions 
examine fi nancial statements when making 
loans. Therefore, it is assumed that the level 
of compliance is higher when a municipality’s 
reliance on debt is greater. According to the 
resource-dependence theory, organizations 
try to increase their compliance with the 
requirements of their resource providers. 
(Froelich, 1999). The fi ndings of Christiaens 
(1999) show that reliance on debt negatively 
affects the compliance level. However, Da 
Casto Carvalho et al. (2007) explain differences 
in municipalities’ compliance in terms of 
fi nancial position, particularly the availability 
of fi nancial resources. We hypothesize that 
relying on loans strongly and visibly increases 
the level of compliance; this increase is also in 
line with resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). Therefore,
H6: Compliance levels are positively 
associated with reliance on debt.
Several studies (Robbins & Austin, 1986; 
Cheng, 1992; Christiaens, 1999) test wealth in 
terms of revenue per capita based on Ingram 
(1984), who assumes that state wealth has 
a positive relationship with increased disclosure. 
Moreover, according to Marti and Kasperskaya 
(2015), countries with high level of economic 
developments are more likely to characterized 
by the presentation of accrual based fi nancial 
Variable Reference Expected Sign Measure Source
EU project Proposed by the current study ? dummy varible activity reports of municipalities
Newly founded 
municipality Proposed by the current study ? dummy variable
Union of Municipalities of 
Turkey
Municipal staff 
education
Ingram, 1984; Christiaens, 1999, 
Christiaens and Peteghem, 2007; 
Da Casto Carvalho et al., 2007
+ the level of the staff’s education 
activity reports and surveys 
sent to municipalities where 
necessaire
Education level of 
citizens Ingram, 1984; Christiaens, 1999; 
Da Costa Carvalho et al., 2007 +
percentage of 
citizens graduated 
from at least 
university
TurkStats
Municipal size Allen and Sanders, 1994; 
Christiaens, 1999; Da Costa 
Carvalho et al. 2007; Robbins and 
Austin, 1986
+/- population TurkStats 
Reliance on debt Christiaens, 1999; Giroux and 
McLelland, 2003; Da Costa 
Carvalho et al. 2007
? fi nancial leverage ratio
fi nancial statements of 
municipalities
Municipal wealth Ingram, 1984; Robbins and Austin, 
1986; Cheng, 1992; Christiaens, 
1999; Giroux and McLelland, 2003
+ revenue per capita fi nancial statements of municipalities, TurkStats
External audit Robbins and Austin, 1986; Windels 
and Christiaens, 2006 + dummy variable
activity reports of 
municipalities, Turkish Court 
of Account
Source: own
Tab. 1: Model variables
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statements. We also hypothesize that the 
level of compliance will be higher in wealthier 
municipalities because of the likelihood that 
there will be better qualifi ed staff, that more 
attention will be given to fi nancial reporting, etc. 
Therefore:
H7: The level of compliance is positively 
associated with the revenue per capita.
Our fi nal hypothesis addresses external 
public sector audits, which are NPM’s ”bread 
and butter” (Buylen & Christiaens, 2014). 
Despite the importance of external audits, 
few studies have addressed them (Robbins 
& Austin, 1986; Christiaens, 1999; Windels & 
Christiaens, 2006). It is assumed that increased 
compliance levels will be caused by external 
auditors’ assessments. An external audit report 
shows how effi ciently a municipality manages 
its resources, which may be an indicator for 
resource suppliers. Particularly in a country 
such as Turkey, where there is a great deal 
of power distance (Hofstede, 1983), it can 
be hypothesized that the level of compliance 
is higher when a municipality is subject to an 
external audit. Therefore,
H8: Compliance levels are positively 
associated with the execution of external audits.
3. Development of the Compliance 
Index
According to Pollitt (2001), there are four stages 
of NPM adoption: discourse, decision making, 
real organization practice and impact on public 
organizations. Our study addresses the third 
stage – real organization practice – with the 
help of a compliance index.
Using an index to measure compliance 
with accounting standards is a time-honored 
methodology in public-sector accounting 
research. Methodologically, this study is based 
on previous studies that have developed 
disclosure and compliance indices. In 1984, 
Ingram provided preliminary evidence about 
the association between economic factors 
and cross-sectional variations in accounting 
practices of state governments in the USA by 
analyzing 12 items in a disclosure index. The 
results showed a higher level of disclosure 
in states with voter coalitions, administrative 
monitoring and evidence of administrative ability. 
Ingram’s study is a milestone in governmental 
accounting research, and several studies have 
used the same approach (Disclosure index: 
Robins & Austin, 1986; Giroux, 1989; Cheng, 
1992; Allen & Sanders, 1994; Tooley & Guthrie, 
2007; Stanley, Jennings & Mack, 2008; Cooke’s 
index: Pina & Torres, 1996; Pina & Torres, 2003; 
Accountability index: Dixon, Coy & Tower, 1991; 
Coy, Tower & Dixon, 1994; Coy & Dixon, 2002; 
Ryan, Stanley & Nilson, 2002; Compliance 
index: Christiaens, 1999; Weets & Jegers, 
2000; Giroux & McLelland, 2000; Christiaens 
& Vanhee, 2003; Da Costa Carvalho, Camoes, 
Jorge & Fernandes, 2007; Christiaens & Van 
Peteghem, 2007).
Based on this body of literature, Christiaens 
(1999), Da Costa Carvalho et al. (2007) and 
Christiaens and Van Peteghem (2007) have 
turned their attention to the implementation 
of business-like accounting principles in their 
public-sector compliance index. Christiaens 
(1999) has included in the compliance index 
not only transparency and technical issues but 
also other features related to compliance with 
newly introduced accounting and reporting 
standards. Transparency issues consist of 
timeliness, disclosure, formalistic requirements, 
adequacy and usefulness elements, whereas 
technical issues consist of completeness, 
cutoff, classifi cation, mechanical accuracy 
and compensation elements. The index is 
a quantitative measure of the qualitative aspects 
of both fi nancial accounting and reporting. 
Similar to Christiaens (1999), Coy and Dixon 
(2004), Da Costa Carvalho et al. (2007), 
and Christiaens and Van Peteghem (2007), 
we used the compliance index to measure 
each municipality’s level of compliance. The 
elements in the index, which consist of 39 
elements, have been measured dichotomously. 
The results of the compliance index determined 
the dependent variable to be used in the 
multiple regression.
4. Data
There are 1,397 municipalities in Turkey, 428 of 
which have a population of more than 25,000. 
We selected the municipalities with populations 
of more than 25,000 because it is diffi cult to 
access small municipalities’ annual accounts. 
An a priori power analysis using G*Power 
3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) 
demonstrated that 74 municipalities would be 
needed to detect the effects (f = 0.15) with 95% 
power (1-β) using linear multiple regression with 
8 predictors and alpha at 0.05. In this study, we 
tested 102 municipalities’ levels of compliance 
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with accrual accounting rules prescribed by 
laws and regulations; this is a much larger 
sample than that proposed by G*Power 3.1. 
The sample consisted of 102 municipalities 
in all regions of Turkey that were randomly 
selected from the 428 municipalities referenced 
above.
The annual reports that we analyze are 
taken from the municipalities’ annual activity 
reports. However, some of the municipalities 
in the sample did not provide their activity 
reports on the Web. In that situation, annual 
reports were provided by the Court of Accounts. 
Secondary data, such as population, age 
structure and the education level of citizens, 
were provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute 
(TurkStat). To measure the staff number and 
the education level of the staff where that 
information was not provided in the annual 
activity reports, a brief online questionnaire was 
sent to the municipalities pursuant to the “Right 
to Obtain Information”. Municipalities were 
asked to give information about the number of 
staff members, their educational levels, and the 
head of fi nance’s educational level.
5. Results
5.1 Compliance index
To calculate each municipality’s level of 
compliance, we adopted the compliance index 
used by prior studies, adding items specifi c to 
Turkey. The average score on the compliance 
index for each municipality, in percentage 
terms, is calculated by multiplying each score 
by 100 and dividing by 39. As a result, according 
to our descriptive statistics, we found a mean of 
Population Number of the municipalities Data set
25,000-49,999 108 26
50,000-99,999 109 17
100,000-249,999 120 22
250,000-499,999 61 26
over 500,000 30 11
Total 428 102
Source: own
Item Average
Transparency
Timeless 67.8%
Disclosure 52.0%
Formalistic Requirements 65.5%
Adequacy and  usefulness 80.0%
Technical Issues
Completeness 47.7%
Cut-Off 26.5%
Classifi cation 99.3%
Mechanical Accurancy 52.5%
Compensation 59.8%
Total 61.2%
Source: own
Tab. 2: Data set
Tab. 3: Compliance index results
EM_3_2017.indd   196 7.9.2017   10:34:37
1973, XX, 2017
Finance
61.2%, with a standard deviation of 13.7% and 
a median of 60.5%. In addition, the average 
fi gures for each component are disclosed in the 
table below.
The average “cutoff” is the lowest 
component, with a mean of 26.5 percent. As 
seen from the compliance index, the cutoff 
component consists of “accrued charges 
disclosed” and “accrued income disclosed.” 
According to our fi ndings, few municipal 
accountants use accrued income and accrued 
charge accounts, perhaps due to a lack of 
experience and training in accrual accounts. In 
addition, provisions for employment termination 
benefi ts are not accrued to the related 
accounts. This result shows relative failure in 
the implementation of accrual-based rules. 
Conversely, the most-used component is the 
“classifi cation” component, which consists of 
sign assets, possibly because of the ease of 
understanding sign assets.
5.2 Regression Equation Results and 
Interpretation
We used multiple regression (Cohen et al., 
2013) to test our model. Each item in the model 
was given equal weight because there is no 
document showing that any item has more of 
an effect than another. In addition, although 
each item measures quite different concepts, 
our statistical results showed that they explain 
54.6% of the dependent variable. In the 
following table, the regression results of our 
study are presented.
The observed F statistic of the regression 
is 13.975, and signifi cance at alpha (= 0.0001) 
demonstrates an acceptable standard of 
accuracy. The variance infl ation factors (VIF) 
are calculated, and there is no multicollinearity 
threat for any of the predictors, because all of 
the VIFs were < 2. Given the normal distribution 
of the index, the standardized regression 
coeffi cients and their associated level of 
signifi cance are also presented in the table.
Based on these results, the most infl uential 
predictors for the level of compliance are as 
follows: (1) newly founded municipalities; (2) 
implementation of an EU-funded project; (3) 
external audit.
As an emerging country variable, we tested 
whether there is an association between 
newly founded municipalities and compliance 
level. According to our results, being a newly 
established municipality emerges as a very 
signifi cant explanatory variable in the model, 
affecting the level of compliance (b = 0.071, β = 
0.155, p = 0.031). An explanation for this high 
level of compliance may be that organizations 
that are pursuing legitimacy select among 
alternatives based on effi ciency considerations 
Surrogates Standardized Coeffi cient (Beta) Signifi cance (p)
Municipal size 0.138 0.062*
Newly founded municipality 0.155 0.031**
Staff education level -0.070 0.409
Citizens‘ education level 0.132 0.083*
EU  project implementation 0.267 0.002**
Reliance on debt 0.016 0.839
Municipal wealth -0.025 0.749
External audit 0.450 0.000**
Source: own
Note: * signifi cant at α = 10%, ** signifi cant at α = 5%, R2 = 0.546
Tab. 4: Regression results
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when their organization fi eld is being founded 
or reorganized (Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 
1993, p. 104), which primarily refl ects the 
infl uence of normative isomorphism (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). It appears that newly founded 
municipalities adopt structures that are 
perceived as legitimate by other organizations 
in the same fi eld regardless of those 
structures’ content. In addition, newly founded 
municipalities that are experiencing fi scal stress 
in the implementation of new policies (such 
as establishing guest houses for women and 
children and making new staff assignments) 
may rely on accrual-based rules to gain more 
legitimacy for the purpose of acquiring short-
term fi nancing. This evidence is an important 
condition that affects the potency of coercive 
isomorphic pressure leading to higher levels 
of compliance. However, we must exercise 
caution in interpreting these results. As noted 
by DiMaggio and Powell (1991), it is diffi cult to 
clearly identify their effects.
Another emerging country variable, the 
implementation of an EU project, is a very 
signifi cant predictor (b = 0.074, β = 0.267, 
p = 0.002) of the level of compliance, because 
the EU demands fi nancial statements that 
are in compliance with international fi nancial 
reporting standards. If the funded municipalities 
do not fulfi ll the required reporting rules, they 
will not be able to obtain grants from the EU, 
which makes them dependent on the resources 
provided by the EU. This evidence underlines 
the presence and the potency of institutional 
pressure, probably in the form of coercive 
isomorphism based on resource dependency. 
In other words, institutional pressure may work 
with other forms of pressure such as resource 
dependency (Mizuchi & Fein, 1999). Another 
possible explanation for this strong effect 
could be that the accountants who work for 
the EU projects’ fi nancial reporting are trained 
in related accounting standards. We infer this 
conclusion from the organized workshops and 
seminars. Benefi ciaries of EU grants participate 
in both workshops and free webinars that 
help them to accurately report their fi nancials 
(http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=45646&l=1). 
In addition, representatives of central 
governments emphasize the importance of the 
EU projects. This evidence emphasizes the 
institutional context and external pressure as 
one of the most important reasons to increase 
compliance with accrual-based rules. In 
addition, this evidence reinforces institutional 
thinking in which changes are associated with 
the need for legitimacy and external support 
for the resources (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; 
Gomes et al., 2015).
As shown by the regression results, the 
variable external audit (b = 0.123, β = 0.450, 
p = 0.000) is the most signifi cant predictor of the 
level of compliance. This may be a consequence 
of the fact that in terms of audits, the Turkish 
Court of Accounts is the institution that has 
the most infl uence on the municipalities, which 
validates the idea that coercive isomorphism 
has an infl uence on municipalities’ willingness 
to comply with the rules. Organizations 
are also driven to a high level of fi nancial 
reporting compliance when they are audited 
by institutions that affect the provision of 
resources. An external report on a municipality 
by the Turkish Court of Accounts also refl ects 
that municipality’s quality, which infl uences 
the subsidies granted by the government. This 
high level of compliance shows that the audit 
environment – not just accounting standards – 
must be modifi ed to induce improved disclosure 
(Ingram & Copeland, 1981). In addition, 
although the internal audit system is found 
in each municipality, the compliance level is 
increased in municipalities where the external 
audit was carried out.
With respect to the size effect, our 
regression results indicate that municipality 
size has a positive signifi cant effect 
(b = 0.000, β = 0.138, p = 0.062) on the 
level of compliance. Several studies have 
shown that the compliance level is higher in 
larger cities (Da Costa Carvalho et al., 2007; 
Ingram & DeJong, 1987; Christiaens, 1999). 
This confi rms that large organizations adopt 
elements from the institutional environment 
both to gain more legitimacy from the actors in 
their external environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) and to sustain opportunities for acquiring 
resources. Another possible explanation is that 
large municipalities may use more complicated 
information systems, thus disclosing more-
transparent information (Bunget, Blidisel, 
Feleaga, & Popa, 2014).
In contrast to the fi ndings of Da Casto 
Carvalho et al. (2007) and Ingram (1984), it 
is interesting that our results did not support 
a relationship between staff educational level 
and compliance level (b = -0.053, β = -0.070, 
p = 0.409). A few studies have demonstrated 
EM_3_2017.indd   198 7.9.2017   10:34:37
1993, XX, 2017
Finance
a similar dissociation between staff education 
and compliance level (Christiaens, 1999). 
Differences in country characteristics may 
account for this discrepancy. In our study, we 
focused on educational level as measured by 
a person’s number of degrees. Rather than 
focusing on school degrees, we could focus 
on the level of accounting knowledge, which 
may be more related to the compliance level. 
However, it is very diffi cult to test accounting 
knowledge.
The hypothesis that citizens’ educational 
level (b = 0.305, β = 0.132, p = 0.083) enhances 
the level of compliance has also proven to be 
well founded. According to our results, the 
educational level of a municipality’s citizens 
positively affects the municipality’s compliance 
level, which overlaps with the fi ndings of Da 
Casto Carvalho et al. (2007). Law no: 4982 
(the right to obtain information) provides that 
everyone has the right to obtain information 
about the activities of all public entities, 
including local governments. However, clearly 
citizens must be aware of this right if they are to 
request information. An obvious explanation for 
this result is that citizens with higher educational 
levels would like to acquire more detailed and 
transparent information, and they are more 
aware of their rights (http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTBELARUS/Resources/eng.
pdf). However, we must exercise caution in 
interpreting these results because we only used 
years of completed education; we did not focus 
on profession, gender, etc. Moreover, income 
per citizen (b = -0.000, β = -0.025, p = 0.749) 
in a municipality has no effect on the level of 
compliance (Robbins & Austin, 1986).
Reliance on debt (b = 0.007, β = 0.016, 
p = 0.839) is a variable that has no effect on 
the level of compliance. For this hypothesis, 
we tested the association between reliance 
on short- and long-term debt (fi nancial 
leverage ratio) and the level of compliance. 
We hypothesized that reliance on debt would 
lead to a higher level of compliance. However, 
according to our regression results, there is no 
signifi cant effect. This result contradicts the 
resource-dependence theory but is in line with 
some of the fi ndings in the literature. As in the 
Belgian case (Christiaens, 1999), it is possible 
that Turkish municipalities are less sensitive 
to fi nancial markets and credit institutions 
because of the special character of the İl Bank, 
which lends only to local governments to meet 
their fi nancing needs in Turkey; the signifi cance 
of this arrangement for local governments is 
primarily due to the İl Bank‘s low interest rate 
compared to other banks. The municipalities 
may take the İl Bank for granted.
Although accrual accounting-based rules 
were implemented nearly ten years ago, more 
time may be required for local governments to 
internalize them. “Moreover, the gap between 
NPM-like thinking and local governance logic, 
as inciting part for the change, seems too 
large to overcome and we must ask ourselves 
whether municipalities can truly incorporate 
the NPM style work into their work” (Buylen & 
Christiaens, 2014). It seems that the changes in 
the accounting system have been implemented 
for the benefi t of the Turkish government’s 
image, especially in the eyes of international 
bodies. These top-down reforms may fi t the 
political agenda very well, but the practitioners 
of the related rules have noted the policy’s 
consequences. We infer this conclusion from 
the observation that an increase in compliance 
levels in the event of an EU-funded project and 
an external audit represent pressures from 
outside the organization.
Finally, we must state that although our study 
explains some variance for the municipalities’ 
level of compliance, there remains a large gap 
to consider. Furthermore, we acknowledge that 
our study have several limitations. First, we 
only tested the municipalities whose population 
is over 25,000 due to problems accessing 
information from smaller municipalities. 
However, smaller municipalities are in the 
majority in Turkey. Second, we acknowledge 
that our results are confi ned to the selected 
hypothesis tested in the study. Third, we 
calculated the compliance index dichotomously 
without considering the items. Moreover, it 
would be useful to apply the results to other 
emerging countries.
Conclusion
This article sheds light on the factors that affect 
the level of compliance with the accrual-based 
rules for municipalities, an undervalued but very 
prominent group among local governments. 
To help both public managers and politicians, 
our study shows that some factors clearly 
help increase the level of compliance: the 
most infl uential factors are the external audit 
(<0.05), the implementation of an EU-funded 
project (<0.05) and being a newly founded 
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municipality (<0.05). More specifi cally, we 
found that coercive institutional pressure to 
implement accrual-based rules may become 
a potent force when a supreme audit institution 
has control and there is resource dependence 
on an international body. Simultaneously, we 
contributed to the literature by adding new 
institutional emerging country-like variables, as 
noted by Carpenter and Feroz (2001). Our study 
suggests that newly founded municipalities and 
municipalities funded by the EU may apply 
accrual-based rules to be more legitimate and 
successful.
The compliance level is 61.2% for 102 
municipalities, which may indicate that 
reforms have (to some extent) hit their targets. 
The general reasons that may account for 
implementation shortfalls are the following: 
Audits are only performed by the Court of 
Accounts, and municipalities are not audited 
every year. There is no legal establishment 
for the audit of municipalities other than the 
Court of Accounts. No penalty is imposed 
on municipalities that do not comply with the 
accrual accounting-based rules. There is no 
guidance for staff to ease the implementation 
of accrual-based rules where such rules create 
extra work and (in particular) increased stress 
levels on the part of the staff. In addition, a clear 
objective for the new accounting system was 
never formulated by the Turkish legislature. 
The only argument for the reform is the need 
for change in the budget accounting system, 
and no preliminary research on municipalities’ 
needs and shortages was conducted before the 
transition to accrual-based rules.
Based on this result, we strongly suggest 
a new design for the public-sector audit. 
The push for independent fi nancial auditing 
independent of the Turkish Court of Accounts 
is also consistent with the current agenda 
of international bodies. Including the private 
sector in the process when the public audit is 
inadequate will obviously increase the level of 
compliance. Moreover, the role of professional 
and academic bodies may play an important role 
in implementing accrual accounting. In addition, 
according to Smoke (2015), implementation is 
often neglected and the state must decide how 
to deal with new functions. In Turkey, many 
accounting societies play an important role in 
developing accounting but do not play an active 
role in the public sector. This may be due to 
the penetration problem suffered by the public 
sector. The creation of a public-sector study 
group may play an important role in solving 
accrual accounting implementation problems.
“Logically, before talking about the 
improved information that comes with the 
implementation of accrual-based rules, we 
should fi nd the right person who can effi ciently 
and effectively administer them” (Ouda, 2004). 
Otherwise, the implementation of accrual 
accounting in the public sector will provide 
superfl uous information that will not be used, 
and the targeted benefi ts will not be achieved 
(Ouda, 2004). The relative relation between 
compliance level and citizen educational level 
is a good indicator for introducing a more 
informative public accounting system. In 
short, governments should shift from a public 
administration system to a public management 
system in parallel with the implementation of 
accrual accounting rules unless the information 
provided by accrual accounting is superfl uous 
to traditional public administration. 
There remain several unanswered 
questions regarding the level of compliance; 
these are matters for further study. The effect 
of bureaucratic management culture, political 
factors, and information technology (Ouda, 
2008) may be studied to assess the level of 
compliance. In addition, in almost all of the 
studies, it is easier to discover “what has been 
done” rather than “what has been obtained” 
(Sezen, 2011, p. 326). One could also argue 
that the good governance version of good or 
effective government is a hollow for developing 
countries (Andrews, 2010, p. 7). The real 
effect of the reforms or rules in question may 
be examined in further research. Indeed, it is 
more important to benefi t from complying with 
accrual-based accounting than to achieve 
a score of 61.2% on the compliance index. 
Such a study may constitute a subject for 
further investigation.
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Abstract
WHY DO SOME MUNICIPALITIES APPLY ACCRUAL-BASED RULES MORE 
THAN OTHERS? EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY
Selver Seda Ada, Johan Christiaens
In the last decades, public sector has been infl uenced by New Public Management emphasizing 
incentives, competition, and performance. With the effect of New Public Management, 
implementation of accrual accounting based rules in the local government level has been studied 
from different aspects and within different contexts. In this study, we seek to further delineate 
factors affecting the level of compliance to accrual based accounting rules in the local government 
level in an emerging country – Turkey. We shed lights on two new emerging country-like variables: 
implementation of European Union funded projects and newly founded municipalities with six control 
variables including municipal size, municipal wealth, citizen education level, staff education level, 
debt ratio and external audit. Data, to be analyzed, is gathered from 102 Turkish municipalities. 
We use compliance index, consisting of 39 items, in order to assess the level of compliance of the 
municipalities. Institutional theory and resource dependence theory have been employed in order 
to increase our understanding on the factors affecting the level of compliance to the accrual based 
rules. The results show moderate compliance, 61.2%, with the accrual based rules. Predictors 
that have clearly signifi cant effect on the level of compliance are respectively, the external audit 
(b = .123, β = .450, p = .000), implementation of EU funded projects (b = .074, β = .267, p = .002) 
and being a newly founded municipality (b = .071, β = .155, p = .031). Moreover, we found that 
coercive institutional pressure to implement accrual-based rules may become a potent force when 
a supreme audit institution has control and there is resource dependence on an international body.
Key Words: Accrual accounting, emerging countries, new public management, public sector 
reform, Turkey.
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